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Fair Use in Trademark in the  
Post-KP Permanent World 
HOW INCORPORATING PRINCIPLES FROM 
COPYRIGHT LAW WILL LEAD TO LESS CONFUSION 
IN TRADEMARK LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine it is Christmas time, and you are looking for a 
gift for your nine-year-old niece Suzie.  You know that Suzie 
loves the television show, American Idol,1 so you resort to the 
Internet and perform a search for the phrase “American Idol.”  
This search brings you to the homepage of Constantine 
Maroulis, a former contestant from the show’s past season.  
The top of the page reads, “Welcome to the homepage of 
Constantine Maroulis: A Real American Idol.”  The page 
contains many references to the television show, including 
screenshots of a few of Constantine’s more memorable 
performances.  You can even purchase Constantine’s debut CD, 
entitled “A Real American Idol,” as well as a life-size 
Constantine Maroulis poster if you are so inclined.  Suzie is a 
big fan, so you buy both, but when you give them to her, she 
starts crying.  Suzie screams, “That’s not the real American 
Idol!  Where’s Kelly Clarkson, Ruben Studdard, and Fantasia 
Barrino?”2   
Failed Christmas presents aside, American Idol has a 
potential claim for trademark infringement against 
Constantine Maroulis, since consumers may incorrectly think 
that the show produced or sponsored Constantine’s CD.  
Trademarks are designed to protect the trade reputation, or 
goodwill, of the trademark owner who, through use and 
advertising, has created an association of his or her product or 
  
 1 American Idol (FOX television broadcast 2002-present).  
 2 Kelly Clarkson, Ruben Studdard, and Fantasia Barrino were the winners 
from the first three seasons.  As winners, American Idol produces and releases their 
debut album.  For more information, see American Idol: About the Show, 
http://www.idolonfox.com/about (last visited Mar. 13, 2006). 
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service with that trademark.3  For a trademark owner to 
succeed on a claim of infringement under the Federal 
Trademark (Lanham) Act,4 he must show that consumers are 
likely to be confused as to the source of the junior user’s 
product.5  Courts typically look at many factors to determine if 
a likelihood of confusion exists.6   
On the other hand, Constantine has a good opportunity 
to assert the statutory fair use defense to trademark 
infringement, since he is simply describing himself as a real 
American idol, and to some, this is an accurate description.  In 
defense to a charge of trademark infringement, a defendant can 
assert the statutory fair use defense of the Lanham Act.7  To 
succeed on this defense, a defendant must show that he used 
the trademark descriptively, not as a trademark, fairly, and in 
good faith.8  Until recently, the U.S. Supreme Court had not 
addressed how courts should handle the fair use defense when 
faced with a seemingly strong claim for trademark 
infringement.  In other words, can Constantine claim that his 
use was fair even though consumers are likely to be confused 
by the origin of the products sold on his website?   
In 2004, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision 
addressing the issue.9  In KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. 
Lasting Impression I, Inc. (“KP Permanent”), the Supreme 
Court held that the statutory fair use defense could succeed 
even in the face of confusion.10  Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court failed to give any indication as to just how much 
confusion could defeat the fair use defense.11  In this Note, I 
will argue that because of the similarities between the concerns 
of copyright and trademark protection, trademark law will 
benefit from incorporating some of the factors from copyright 
law’s fair use defense as an aid to lower courts being asked to 
decide whether a use is fair.  Although copyright law differs 
  
 3 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 3:2 (4th ed., 2005). 
 4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2000). 
 5 Id. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). 
 6 See infra note 32. 
 7 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 8 Id. 
 9 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 
111 (2004). 
 10 Id. at 122 (holding that “some possibility of consumer confusion must be 
compatible with fair use”). 
 11 Id. at 123 (recognizing that while “mere risk of confusion will not rule out 
fair use, we think it would be improvident to go further in this case”). 
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from trademark law in that it protects original works of 
authorship such as songs or books, there are substantial 
similarities between the two that justify incorporation.12 
In trademark law prior to KP Permanent, the circuit 
courts disagreed on the role that confusion played in a fair use 
defense.13  The Ninth Circuit, which issued the decision leading 
to the Supreme Court’s ruling in KP Permanent, allowed 
confusion to defeat a fair use defense and required the 
defendant to prove the absence of likely confusion.14  In 
opposition to that view, the Second Circuit allowed fair use to 
succeed even upon a showing of some confusion and did not 
require a defendant to negate any likelihood of confusion.15  
Other courts fell somewhere in the middle.16  In KP Permanent, 
the Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit, holding 
that fair use could exist in the face of confusion, but left open to 
interpretation just how much confusion would defeat a fair use 
defense.17  The Court’s decision effectively left lower courts with 
a blank check, and those courts have not balked at the ability 
to write their own rules.18 
Copyright law’s fair use test has given lower courts the 
clear guidance lacking in trademark law, and similar principles 
and factors from that test are inherent in trademark law.19  In 
copyright law, it is well established that fair use is an 
affirmative defense to infringement.20  After decades of judge-
  
 12 See discussion infra Part III. 
 13 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 14 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 
1072 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 111 (2004). 
 15 See, e.g., Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 
125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that any confusion that results “is a risk the 
plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with a mark that uses a well 
known descriptive phrase”) (citing Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 
F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 16 See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (finding that a “likelihood of confusion forecloses a fair use defense”); 
Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983) (providing 
that any likelihood of confusion bars the fair use defense); but cf. Shakespeare Co. v. 
Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[t]he fair use 
defense comes into play only when infringement – including a likelihood of confusion – 
has been established”); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 
1059 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that fair use could succeed even in the face of likely 
confusion).  
 17 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
116-17 (2004). 
 18 See discussion infra Part I.E. 
 19 See discussion infra Part III. 
 20 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also discussion infra Part II. 
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made law,21 Congress codified the doctrine in section 107 of the 
Copyright Act of 1976.22  Section 107 defined four factors that 
courts should look at to determine if an alleged infringing use 
is fair.23  These factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the 
use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used; and (4) the effect of the use 
on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.24  
While there is no per se formula for what constitutes fair use, 
certain combinations of these factors will make a fair use 
defense more likely to succeed.25  
Some judges have already begun to implicitly apply 
copyright concepts to trademark cases.26  This Note will 
demonstrate why these judges are moving in the right direction 
and suggest further ways to implement this new approach.  
Part I begins with a history of fair use in trademark, including 
the circuit split that led to the decision in KP Permanent.  This 
section will also address the Court’s holding in KP Permanent 
and illustrate the Court’s reasoning for establishing fair use as 
an absolute defense.  This section will conclude by discussing 
the state of the fair use defense following KP Permanent and 
the ways in which lower courts have begun to apply the 
Supreme Court’s holding.   
Part II will discuss the background of fair use in 
copyright, and the factors that courts apply to determine fair 
use.  This section will also illustrate typical applications of the 
copyright fair use test and instances in which courts have 
upheld or denied use as fair.  Part III will look at the 
similarities between the principles of trademark and copyright 
protection as well as their respective fair use defenses.  In 
order to suggest that trademark law should incorporate 
elements of copyright law, this section will illustrate the 
similar concerns of both areas of the law in granting protection 
  
 21 The concept of fair use in copyright first appeared in a judicial opinion in 
1841.  See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).  The 
term “fair use” in copyright first appeared in a judicial opinion in 1869.  See Lawrence 
v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).   
 22 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See, e.g., Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1096 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (fair use defense failed even though the fourth factor favored the 
defendant); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (while 
suggesting fair use on the first three factors, the Court remanded to allow the hole in 
the evidence with respect to the fourth factor to “be plugged on remand”). 
 26 See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. 
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and allowing fair use.  This section will also address the notion 
that the scope of trademarks is expanding, which warrants a 
further examination of their protection.   
Finally, Part IV will argue that trademark law can 
borrow specific principles from copyright law to lead to less 
confusion in the lower courts.  This section will demonstrate 
how borrowing certain aspects of the copyright test and 
incorporating them into their counterparts in trademark will 
provide courts with a more consistent approach to fair use in 
trademark and ultimately lead to less confusion in litigation.   
I. TRADEMARKS AND FAIR USE 
A trademark is a designation that identifies and 
distinguishes a seller’s goods from those of its competitors.27  
By attaching a trademark to its goods, a seller alerts the public 
that goods bearing this trademark come from that seller and 
are of a certain quality.28  For example, when a consumer sees a 
small insignia of a polo player on a horse on the breast of a 
man’s shirt, he knows that shirt was manufactured by Polo,29 
and this brand alerts the buyer to a level of quality in the shirt.  
Trademarks are granted legal protection to safeguard this 
trade reputation of the trademark owner who has created an 
association of a product or service with that trademark.30  
When someone other than the trademark owner begins selling 
goods using a similar name, the trademark owner may succeed 
on a claim of infringement by showing that consumers are 
likely to be confused by the similarities.31  In these cases, courts 
conduct an intense fact-finding inquiry to determine if a 
likelihood of confusion exists.32   
  
 27 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 3:1. 
 28 Id. § 3:2. 
 29 Polo is a popular brand of clothing, best known for its logo consisting of a 
horse which often appears on the breast of a man’s collared shirt.  For more 
information, see About Ralph Lauren, http://about.polo.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2006). 
 30 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 3:2. 
 31 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). 
 32 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 
1961) (defining the factors to consider as: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s trademark; 
(2) the degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the proximity of the products or 
services; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) 
a defendant’s bad faith in adopting its mark; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product; 
and (8) the sophistication of the buyers). 
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A.  Statutory, or “Classic,” Fair Use 
In defense to a charge of trademark infringement, a 
defendant can assert the statutory fair use defense of the 
Lanham Act.33  To succeed on this defense, a defendant must 
show that he used the trademark descriptively and not as a 
trademark, fairly, and in good faith.34  For example, a 
housecleaning service who advertises that they will “Clean up 
your Windows” can assert the statutory fair use defense if faced 
with allegations of infringement by Microsoft.35  Statutory fair 
use is also referred to as “classic” fair use, since it existed 
under the common law of unfair competition prior to the 
enactment of the Lanham Act.36  In passing the Lanham Act, 
Congress codified the doctrine and established that a user 
accused of infringement can assert the statutory affirmative 
defense of fair use.37  The fair use defense, in essence, restricts 
a trademark owner from exercising exclusive rights over a 
descriptive term which would prevent others from accurately 
describing their product.38  Specifically, the Lanham Act 
requires that three elements be met to establish the defense: 
(1) the challenged infringement must not be used as a trade or 
service mark; (2) the challenged infringement must describe 
the goods; and (3) use must be fair and in good faith.39  While 
the first two factors involve relatively simple factual inquiries, 
  
 33 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).   
 34 The relevant portion of 15 U.S.C. § 1115 provides:  
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a 
use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s individual name in his own 
business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of 
a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only 
to describe to users the goods or services of such party, or their geographic 
origin . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 35 Microsoft is a corporation which manufactures computer hardware and 
software, most notably, the Windows operating system.  For more information, see 
Microsoft Corporation homepage, http://www.microsoft.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2006). 
 36 See, e.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 528 
(1924) (stating that “[t]he use of a similar name by another to truthfully describe his 
own product does not constitute a legal or moral wrong, even if its effect be to cause the 
public to mistake the origin or ownership of the product”). 
 37 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).  
 38 Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(permitting fair use “forbids a trademark registrant to appropriate a descriptive term 
for his exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a characteristic 
of their goods”). 
 39 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
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the final factor implicates much more subjective analysis, and 
courts have come to strikingly different conclusions on what 
constitutes fair use.40 
Before a defendant can assert statutory fair use as a 
defense to an infringement claim, the plaintiff must first show 
that its trademark is valid and that defendant’s use of the 
trademark is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception 
among consumers as to the source of defendant’s goods or 
services.41  Once a plaintiff has established both of these 
elements, a defendant may claim that his or her use is fair as 
an affirmative defense.42  In permitting fair use of trademarks, 
the Lanham Act seeks to prohibit a trademark owner from 
precluding others from describing their goods.43   
By choosing a potentially descriptive mark, a plaintiff 
runs a significant risk, because a competitor may want to use 
those same words to accurately describe his or her product.44  
For example, although Tasti-D-Lite is a registered trademark, 
a competing ice cream shop may wish to advertise that its ice 
cream is tasty and delightful.  Generally, the law prefers to 
avoid monopolies, but trademark law often grants exclusive 
rights, because there is a seemingly endless supply of potential 
trademarks, and the cost of the monopoly to society is seen as 
insignificant.45  In other words, in the Tasti-D-Lite example, a 
  
 40 Compare PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 
(6th Cir. 2003) (finding that a “likelihood of confusion forecloses a fair use defense”); 
Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983) (providing 
that any likelihood of confusion bars the fair use defense) with Shakespeare Co. v. 
Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[t]he fair use 
defense comes into play only when infringement – including a likelihood of confusion – 
has been established”); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 
1059 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that fair use could succeed even in the face of likely 
confusion). 
 41 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 
2000) (stating that “[t]o prevail on [a claim of] trademark infringement [a plaintiff 
must] prove that [its trademark] is a protectable trademark and that [defendant’s use] 
is likely to confuse consumers as to the source of sponsorship of [plaintiff’s] product”). 
 42 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 43 U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (allowing fair use “to prevent the trademark rights of one party from being 
extended to preclude another party from the description of his product to the public” 
(citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 477, 486 (1983))), aff’d, 923 F.2d 844 
(2d Cir. 1990).  A plaintiff choosing a descriptive mark “cannot altogether exclude some 
kinds of competing uses.” Id. 
 44 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
 45 U.S. Shoe Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 198 (stating that trademark law permits 
monopolies “because potential identifying marks exist in virtually inexhaustible supply 
[and] the cost of the monopoly to society is minimal”). 
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competitor should have no problem using words other than 
“tasty” or “delightful” to convey the same message without 
causing unnecessary confusion in the marketplace.  
Nevertheless, since the cost to society increases if a trademark 
owner is granted exclusive use of a descriptive trademark, fair 
use exists in part to help balance the interests in trademark 
protection and unfair competition.46  Unfortunately, statutory 
fair use leaves open the question: at what point is the cost of 
confusion created by fair use too great for society to tolerate?  
When a defendant uses another’s trademark in the non-
descriptive sense, however, he may still avoid a claim of 
infringement if his use falls under the nominative fair use 
doctrine. 
B.  Nominative Fair Use  
While statutory fair use allows a defendant to use a 
trademark to describe its own product or service descriptively, 
nominative fair use allows a defendant to use a trademark to 
describe the trademark owner’s product or service.47  For 
example, an advertising campaign for “Brand X” that claims “If 
you like Brand Y, you’ll love Brand X” is an example of a 
nominative fair use.  The nominative fair use defense is 
entirely a product of the judiciary.48  The leading court in 
addressing nominative fair use, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, defined three elements required to successfully assert 
a nominative fair use claim: (1) “the product or service in 
question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the 
trademark;” (2) “only so much of the mark or marks may be 
used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or 
service;” and (3) “the user must do nothing that would, in 
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.”49  For example, when 
former Playboy Playmate of the Year, Terri Welles, used the 
words “Playmate of the Year” to describe herself on her 
website, the court upheld the use as fair under the nominative 
fair use doctrine, because the words sought only “to identify 
  
 46 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 47 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:45 (discussing the distinctions 
between statutory and nominative fair use). 
 48 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
 49 Id. 
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Welles as a past . . . ‘Playmate of the Year’” and not to 
“imply . . . current sponsorship or endorsement by [Playboy].”50   
Nominative fair use appears in many different forms.  
In addition to the referential use in the Terri Welles case and 
the comparative advertising in the “Brand X” example, 
nominative fair use also arises in promotional use and parody.  
An example of promotional use includes the sale of a t-shirt by 
a third party bearing a trademark such as a sports team.  
Danish band Aqua’s infamous song entitled Barbie Girl is a 
good example of parody.51  Courts have often wrestled with how 
to handle nominative fair use claims, particularly in the area of 
parody and promotional use.52  In parody, courts have 
consistently agreed that, in order to be successful, a parody 
must convey two conflicting messages: that it actually is the 
original, but also that it is not the original but rather a 
parody.53  This creates an obvious conflict in policy, because the 
more successful the parody, the more confused a consumer will 
be at first glance.  Therefore, nominative fair use raises similar 
problems as that of statutory fair use in that courts must 
create their own rules to determine how confusion relates to 
the fair use defense.  The questionable relationship between 
confusion and the fair use defense created a division of 
interpretations amongst the circuit courts.54 
C. The Lead-Up to KP Permanent 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent, 
the circuit courts disagreed on the significance of likely 
  
 50 Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800-02 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 51 AQUA, Barbie Girl, on AQUARIUM (MCA Records 1997). 
 52 In the promotional use line of cases, there are clearly two schools of 
thought.  One approach finds infringement even when no confusion as to source exists.  
See Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (holding that patches sold by a sporting goods store bearing the insignia of a 
professional sports team constituted infringement even though consumers purchased 
the patches to show allegiance and not because of their source).  The other approach to 
promotional use assesses whether consumers view the use of the trademark as a source 
identifier to determine whether confusion exists.  See Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. 
Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that jewelry bearing the 
trademark of a young women’s fraternal organization did not constitute infringement 
because purchasers did not see the trademark as identifying source).  Parody is equally 
conflicting.  
 53 Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 
494 (2d Cir. 1989). (noting that “[c]onflict between . . . policies is inevitable in the 
context of parody, because the keystone of parody is imitation”). 
 54 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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confusion as it pertains to a fair use defense.55  The Second 
Circuit represented one point of view, holding that fair use is 
an absolute defense to infringement regardless of the confusion 
that results.56  The Ninth Circuit required a defendant to prove 
the absence of confusion and found that a failure to do so 
diminished the likelihood of a fair use claim to prevail.57  
Amongst the other circuits, both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits 
held that any likelihood of confusion bars the fair use defense,58 
while the Fourth and Seventh Circuits held that fair use could 
succeed even in the face of likely confusion.59  Under the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach, the owner of an ice cream shop who 
advertises that his ice cream is “tasty” cannot succeed on a fair 
use defense against Tasti-D-Lite unless he or she proves that 
consumers do not confuse his goods with those from Tasti-D-
Lite.  In the Second Circuit, the fair use defense could succeed 
in this example even if Tasti-D-Lite were able to prove that 
nearly all ice cream consumers were confused by the other 
store’s advertisement.  Regardless of the circuits’ conflicting 
interpretations of the relevant provisions of the Lanham Act, 
the statute gives no indication as to how much confusion is too 
much.60  The Supreme Court had yet to address this issue 
either.  In fact, the significance of confusion in a fair use 
defense provided the Court with its justification for granting 
certiorari.61  
  
 55 The views of the Ninth and Second Circuits lay at the heart of the circuit 
split.  The Ninth Circuit represented the view that any confusion would defeat a 
statutory fair use defense.  See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 
Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 111 (2004).  The Second 
Circuit opposed this view, finding that fair use is a defense to liability even if there is a 
likelihood of confusion.  See Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s 
USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1977). Although the circuit split that led to KP 
Permanent did not involve nominative fair use claims, courts have shown equal 
disagreement with the relationship of confusion in the nominative fair use context.  See 
supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
 56 Cosmetically Sealed, 125 F.3d at 30 (holding that any resulting confusion 
from alleged infringement is inherent in the risk that plaintiff took in selecting the 
descriptive term, and therefore, does not bar the fair use defense). 
 57 KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1072. 
 58 See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th 
Cir. 2003); Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 59 See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 
1997); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
 60 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 61 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
116 (2004) (granting certiorari “to address a disagreement among the Courts of 
Appeals on the significance of likely confusion for a fair use defense to a trademark 
infringement claim”). 
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In the months before the Court’s decision, scholars 
speculated about how the Court would rule, and the 
implications different rulings would create.62  Most thought 
that the Court would side with the Second Circuit’s approach 
in allowing confusion to exist in a fair use defense.63  Others 
foresaw the danger a ruling siding with the Ninth Circuit could 
create.64  As one scholar noted, by affirming the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding, “[s]ummary judgment would rarely be granted when a 
fair use defense is asserted because the defendant would have 
to disprove likelihood of confusion – a fact-intensive inquiry 
that is typically part of the plaintiff’s case.”65  This could either 
preclude summary judgment altogether or defeat its purpose in 
avoiding the fact-intensive inquiries of litigation when a 
defendant asserts fair use.66 
D. The KP Permanent Case 
1.  Background and Procedural History 
With the legal landscape ripe for change, the basis for 
KP Permanent arose as follows.  Petitioner KP Permanent 
Make-Up, Inc. (“KP”) and Respondent Lasting Impression I, 
Inc. (“Lasting Impression”) both manufactured and sold 
permanent makeup, “a mixture of pigment and liquid for 
injection under the skin to camouflage injuries and modify 
nature’s dispensations,” and in doing so, both used the term 
“microcolor” in marketing their products.67  In 1992, Lasting 
Impression federally registered a trademark with the words 
  
 62 See generally Lynda M. Braun, Fair Is Fair, But Is It Enough?, 4 IP LAW & 
BUS. 54 (2004); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist 
Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 208-10 (2004); David S. Welkowitz, The 
Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1659, 1697-1700 (2004). 
 63 See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 62, at 208 (predicting that “the Court will 
find that the availability of a fair use defense is not conditioned on there being no 
likelihood of confusion”). 
 64 See, e.g., Braun, supra note 62 (speculating on the dangers of affirming the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion). 
 65 Id. 
 66 To disprove confusion, a defendant “would have to conduct a survey and/or 
go to trial to prove an absence of likelihood of confusion.”  Id.  This would create suits 
that are “longer and more costly.”  Id. 
 67 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
114 (2004).  The Court noted that both used the term “as one word or two, singular or 
plural.”  Id. 
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“Micro Colors” written in a small graphic.68  KP, however, 
continued to use the word “microcolor” to describe its goods, 
and, in response to a ten-page advertising brochure put out by 
KP in 1999, Lasting Impression requested that KP discontinue 
its use of the term.69  This led to a lawsuit in which Lasting 
Impression alleged trademark infringement, among other 
claims, and KP asserted the statutory fair use defense.70  The 
district court granted KP’s motion for summary judgment, 
finding that KP’s use of “microcolors” was fair, but declined to 
address the question of whether confusion may result.71  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, criticizing the lower court’s 
failure to address the issue of confusion, and remanded to 
determine whether a likelihood of confusion existed.72  The 
Ninth Circuit also appeared to place the burden of proof as to 
confusion upon KP.73  The Supreme Court granted KP’s petition 
for certiorari to address the disagreement among the circuit 
courts on the relevance of likely confusion to a fair use defense 
and to determine which party bears the burden in proving 
confusion or the absence thereof.74 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Decision   
Justice Souter delivered the opinion for the unanimous 
Supreme Court, holding that the party claiming fair use does 
not bear the burden of negating the likelihood of confusion.75  
This did not come as a surprise, since the Ninth Circuit stood 
alone in suggesting that the defendant bears that burden.76  In 
  
 68 Id. at 114-15. 
 69 Id. at 115. 
 70 Id. 
 71 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., No. CV-00-
00276-GLT (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2001).  Author’s note: There is some confusion, no pun 
intended, as to the full name of Lasting Impression.  While at the circuit court and 
Supreme Court levels, they are referred to as “Lasting Impression I, Inc.,” at the 
district court level, they are referred to as “Lasting Impression, Inc.”  
 72 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 
1072-73 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 111 (2004). 
 73 Id. at 1072 (stating that “KP can only benefit from the fair use defense if 
there is no likelihood of confusion between KP’s use of the term ‘micro color’ and 
Lasting’s mark”). 
 74 KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 116 (granting certiorari “to address a 
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on the significance of likely confusion for a 
fair use defense to a trademark infringement claim”). 
 75 Id. at 112 (noting that the Lanham Act “places a burden of proving 
likelihood of confusion (that is, infringement) on the party charging infringement”). 
 76 KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1072. 
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answering the more important question of the relationship of 
confusion to the fair use defense,77 Justice Souter created, 
ironically enough, greater confusion for lower courts addressing 
the statutory fair use defense.78  The Court did make clear that 
fair use could prevail in the face of confusion but gave no 
guidance as to just how much confusion would defeat the 
defense of fair use.79  In addition, the Court acknowledged that 
lower courts may consider likelihood of confusion when 
determining whether a use is fair.80  It is also worth noting that 
the Court did not give any indication as to whether its analysis 
was applicable to nominative fair use.81  Given this backdrop, 
the Court left open the door for the circuit courts to create their 
own balancing tests for determining the success or failure of a 
fair use defense when faced with a likelihood of confusion.   
E. Fair Use in the Post-KP Permanent World 
In the first year after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
KP Permanent, only a few courts have addressed fair use 
claims, and these decisions demonstrate the lack of guidance 
that the Court’s decision provided for the lower courts.82  While 
courts currently recognize that the plaintiff bears the burden in 
proving a likelihood of confusion and that fair use can exist in 
the face of confusion,83 the role that confusion plays in a fair 
use defense, particularly in the nominative fair use context,84 
has left courts without direction.   
  
 77 KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 120-23. 
 78 See discussion infra Part I.E. 
 79 KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 123 (holding that while “mere risk of confusion 
will not rule out fair use, we think it would be improvident to go further in this case”). 
 80 Id. at 115 n.3 (refusing to address nominative fair use because it is not 
“relevant to the question before us”). 
 81 For one case which discusses the effect of KP Permanent on a nominative 
fair use case, see Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  See also discussion infra Part I.E.  
 82 This note will discuss three cases which provide particularly good 
examples of the problems created by the Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent.  
See discussion infra notes 85-107 and accompanying text. 
 83 See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 
F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a defendant raising the fair use defense 
“has no independent burden to negate the likelihood of any confusion” and that “fair 
use can occur along with some degree of confusion”) (quoting KP Permanent, 543 U.S. 
at 123-24); New York Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinentalexchange, Inc., 389 F. 
Supp. 2d 527, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same). 
 84 See, e.g., Century 21, 425 F.3d at 214 (3d Cir. 2005) (addressing a 
nominative fair use claim after KP Permanent and determining “the extent to which its 
reasoning applies”). 
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On remand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reassessed the merits of KP’s fair use claim but again denied 
their motion for summary judgment.85  Even after the Supreme 
Court had vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the lower court 
came to the exact same conclusion,86 demonstrating just how 
much leeway the Supreme Court had left for lower courts to 
work with.  In fact, with regards to how much confusion 
precludes the fair use defense, the Ninth Circuit expressly 
recognized that the Supreme Court gave lower courts the 
authority to determine the relationship between the two.87  The 
circuit court then proceeded to address both the likelihood of 
confusion and the fair use defense88 and found that the jury 
should consider likelihood of confusion when addressing the 
fairness of the use.89  Therefore, the court again concluded that 
the district court’s granting of KP’s motion for summary 
judgment was improper.90   
The Ninth Circuit’s decision creates a great problem for 
judicial efficiency.  Since a plaintiff must prove some material 
issue of fact as to the likelihood of confusion before a defendant 
asserts fair use,91 there will never be an occasion to grant a 
defendant summary judgment on a fair use claim under this 
approach.  In other words, because a plaintiff has, in theory, 
already established a genuine issue of material fact as to 
confusion by the time a defendant asserts fair use, there will 
always be a genuine issue of material fact in a fair use claim.   
In another recent case, New York Mercantile Exchange, 
Inc. v. Intercontinentalexchange, Inc.,92 the Southern District of 
New York was given the opportunity to offer its interpretation 
of “classic” fair use after the Supreme Court’s decision in KP 
Permanent.  That case involved, among many claims, 
  
 85 KP Permanent, 408 F.3d at 609. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 607 (stating that the issue of how much confusion precludes the fair 
use defense “was left for the consideration of the Ninth Circuit in this case”). 
 88 Id. at 608-09. The court held that “the degree of consumer confusion 
remains a factor in evaluating fair use.” Id. at 609. 
 89 Id. (finding likelihood of confusion “[a]mong the relevant factors for 
consideration by the jury in determining the fairness of the use”). 
 90 Id.  Author’s note: The district court has yet to hear this case on remand as 
of the writing of this note. 
 91 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  See also KP Permanent Make-
Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 120 (2004) (stating that “it is only 
when a plaintiff has shown likely confusion by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
defendant could have any need of an affirmative defense”). 
 92 389 F. Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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allegations of trademark infringement to which the defendant 
asserted the classic fair use defense.93  New York Mercantile 
Exchange (“NYMEX”), a commodities futures exchange, 
brought a suit against Intercontinentalexchange (“ICE”), an 
online competitor, for ICE’s unauthorized use of NYMEX’s 
service marks.94  NYMEX asserted that ICE could not claim 
fair use in the face of confusion, apparently overlooking the 
Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent.95  Oddly enough, 
NYMEX had never offered any evidence to allege actual 
confusion or even a likelihood of confusion.96  The court granted 
ICE’s motion for summary judgment due to the lack of 
confusion, and never reached the merits of the fair use claim.97  
In any event, this opinion still bears some significance on the 
state of classic fair use following KP Permanent.  While the 
Southern District of New York correctly concluded that fair use 
could co-exist with confusion, the court seemed to suggest that 
if a defendant establishes fair use on the merits, any confusion 
is irrelevant.98 
Finally, in Century 21 Real Estate Corporation v. 
Lendingtree, Inc.,99 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals offered 
its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in KP 
Permanent as it relates to nominative fair use.  The Third 
Circuit adopted an original two-step approach to nominative 
fair use cases quite similar to the approach followed in the 
“classic” fair use cases.100  The first step requires the plaintiff to 
prove a likelihood of confusion from defendant’s use of the 
  
 93 Id. at 529. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 546 (noting that the cases upon which NYMEX relies 
“predate . . . the Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent Make-Up”).  
 96 Id. (recognizing that “NYMEX has not raised any issue of material fact 
that a likelihood of confusion exists” and “offered no evidence [of] actual customer 
confusion”) (emphasis added). 
 97 Id.  
 98 See New York Mercantile Exch., 389 F. Supp. 2d at 545 (stating that 
NYMEX’s assertion that fair use cannot exist in the face of confusion is “wrong as a 
matter of law”).  It is questionable as to how the court would have ruled if faced with 
evidence of confusion as it did make sure to point out that no confusion was alleged nor 
did any exist.  Id. at 546.  Nonetheless, the language in this portion of the opinion 
suggests that the court had no reservations about upholding a use as fair in the face of 
confusion.  Id. at 545. 
 99 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 100 Id. at 222 (“Today we adopt a two-step approach in nominative fair use 
cases.”). 
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mark.101  Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant 
can assert fair use, which the court analyzes under the three-
pronged nominative fair use test.102  The dissenting judge in 
this case found the majority’s new test to create too heavy a 
burden on the defendant, as he would likely bear the burden of 
negating confusion.103  This opinion also found critics amongst 
some of intellectual property law’s foremost legal scholars.104  J. 
Thomas McCarthy, author of one of the leading treatises on 
trademark law and founder of the McCarthy Institute for 
Intellectual Property and Technology Law at the University of 
San Francisco School of Law, commented, “I’ve spent many 
decades studying trademark law, and this is one of the most 
confusing cases I’ve seen . . . .”105  Since nominative fair use is 
entirely judge-made law, these cases provide the sole 
framework to such claims and bear great significance.  The 
Third Circuit, while well-intentioned, may not have put forth 
the best approach.   
The only other case to address nominative fair use after 
the Court’s decision in KP Permanent did not alter the prior 
nominative fair use test106 as defined in the Ninth Circuit.107  
All of these cases following KP Permanent demonstrate the 
need for the Court or Congress to clarify the relationship 
between confusion and fair use in trademark law. 
II. COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE 
Similar to trademark law, courts in copyright cases 
have historically protected certain unauthorized but fair uses 
of protected material from claims of infringement.108  Copyright 
  
 101 Id.  While the plaintiff must show a likelihood of confusion, the court 
suggested altering the traditional test for likelihood of confusion by eliminating certain 
factors of the test “that do not ‘fit’ in the nominative use context.”  Id. 
 102 Id.  For the three factors of the nominative fair use test, see New Kids on 
the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 103 Century 21, 425 F.3d at 233 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (concluding that the 
majority’s test “places on defendant the burden of negating likely confusion”). 
 104 See G.M. Filisko, Trademark Ruling Creates Confusion, 4-43 ABA 
JOURNAL E-REPORT 2 (Oct. 21, 2005).  
 105 Id. 
 106 See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., No. 99-C-5565, 2005 WL 464688, at *6 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005) (noting that even after KP Permanent, “[t]he New Kids test 
provides sound criteria for assessing when nominative use is fair or unfair, despite a 
likelihood of confusion among consumers). 
 107 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
 108 For what is regarded as, perhaps, the first discussion of a fair use claim in 
copyright, see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).  
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law seeks to protect “original works of authorship” such as a 
song, a book, or a photograph.109  The roots of this protection 
are well-grounded in United States history, as the Constitution 
empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”110  In order for a work to be protected, it must 
consist of some amount of originality and creativity.111  
Copyright infringement requires the exact copying of a 
protected work or proof of substantial similarity and access to 
the copyrighted work.112   
The term “fair use” made its first appearance in a 
copyright opinion in 1869, when an author borrowed material 
from an earlier publication of a work while scripting a new 
edition.113  For over 100 years, the fair use doctrine existed 
entirely in judge-made law.  In the mid-1970s, Congress 
codified the doctrine of fair use in the Copyright Act of 1976.114  
The Copyright Act permits fair use to operate as an affirmative 
defense to a claim of infringement if, after looking at four 
statutory factors and balancing their equities, the court deems 
the use as fair.115  The factors to which the court must look are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used; and (4) the effect of the use on the potential 
market or value of the copyrighted work.116  These four factors 
are not exclusive and often overlap when courts decide whether 
use is fair.  Although there is no prescribed formula to 
determine fair use, some uses garner a stronger likelihood of 
success than others in a fair use claim.117 
  
In Folsom, an author of a biography on President Washington had borrowed material 
from an earlier work, mainly letters written by George Washington himself.  Id. at 343.  
The court asked “whether this is a justifiable use of the original materials.”  Id. at 348.  
In determining whether the use was fair, Justice Story looked to “the nature and 
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the 
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede 
the objects, of the original work.”  Id.   
 109 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 111 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 112 Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 113 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136). 
 114 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 115 Id.   
 116 Id. 
 117 See discussion infra Part II.A and Part II.B. 
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A. Purpose and Character of Use 
Under the first factor of the fair use test, courts look at 
the purpose and character of the use.118  Alleged infringing uses 
can be divided into two sub-categories: (1) transformative or 
non-transformative use; and (2) commercial or non-commercial 
use.119  Courts generally do not extend the fair use doctrine to 
commercial, non-transformative uses, because such uses 
contain no originality and seek to reap where one has not 
sown.120  On the other hand, if a non-commercial use 
significantly transforms a work, courts will generally uphold 
the use as fair.121  A more difficult situation arises when use is 
transformative but commercial, or non-transformative but non-
commercial, and courts have faced a significantly greater 
challenge in determining whether use is fair in these 
situations. 
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (“Acuff-Rose”), the 
United States Supreme Court held that although the rap group 
2 Live Crew created a parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” for commercial gain, they had significantly 
transformed the song, and therefore, fair use could prevail.122  
The holders of the copyright to the famous Roy Orbison song 
had sued 2 Live Crew, alleging infringement, suggesting that 
the commercial use of the song constituted a presumptively 
unfair use of a copyrighted work.123  Although the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the fair use defense was barred by the 
song’s commercial character and excessive borrowing,124 the 
Supreme Court reversed with Justice Stevens writing the 
opinion for a unanimous Court.125   
  
 118 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).  
 119 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000) (assessing “whether such use is of a 
commercial nature”); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) 
(stating that in assessing the purpose of the use, courts should also consider “whether 
and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative’”). 
 120 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 
(1984) (noting that if an alleged infringer copied a protected work for commercial gain, 
“such use would presumptively be unfair”). 
 121 See Acuff Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that “the more transformative the 
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors . . . that may weigh against a 
finding of fair use”). 
 122 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 594. 
 123 Id. at 572-74. 
 124 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992), 
rev’d by, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 125 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 594. 
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In analyzing the first factor of the fair use defense, 
Justice Stevens drew implicitly upon free speech principles, 
ignoring the strong sexual content and illicit language in 2 Live 
Crew’s song.126  Although the lyrics of 2 Live Crew’s song 
contained “degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a 
sigh of relief from paternal responsibility” which would surely 
make the members of the Court cringe, they nonetheless 
upheld the use as fair.127  Warning that “[t]his is not, of course, 
to say that anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim the 
cream and get away scot free,” Justice Stevens rested the 
pinnacle of the Court’s holding on the transformative character 
of the use, since 2 Live Crew “departed markedly” from the 
lyrics in the Roy Orbison classic.128 
In a similarly murky area of the first factor of the fair 
use test lies the non-transformative, yet non-commercial use, 
such as that in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc. (“Sony”), which involved the introduction of the 
home videotape recorder in America.129  In Sony, copyright 
holders in the television industry brought a suit against the 
manufacturers of home videotape recorders.130  Since the 
purchasers of such devices could use them to record protected 
works, the copyright holders opposed the sale of the devices, 
alleging infringement, based on the non-transformative use.131  
The Court acknowledged that if consumers used the devices to 
make a profit, the fair use defense would not apply.132  The 
Court, however, characterized the use as non-commercial since 
most purchasers of the device simply sought to watch their 
favorite programs at different times.133  Arguably, the Court 
could have found the use commercial, but chose instead to focus 
on the time-shifting,134 which held no commercial purpose.135 
  
 126 Id. at 582 (stating that “[w]hether . . . parody is in good taste or bad does 
not and should not matter to fair use”). 
 127 See id. at 583. 
 128 Id. at 589 (stating that “2 Live Crew not only copied the first line of the 
original, but thereafter departed markedly from the Orbison lyrics for its own ends”). 
 129 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 420. 
 132 Id. at 449 (stating that “to make copies for a commercial or profit-making 
purpose . . . would presumptively be unfair”). 
 133 Id. (characterizing “time-shifting for private home use . . . as a 
noncommercial, nonprofit activity”). 
 134 Time-shifting refers to the idea that users of a home video recording device 
simply shift the time at which they watch programs.  Id. at 421. 
 135 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50. 
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Both the Court’s decision in Acuff-Rose and Sony 
demonstrated the complexity in analyzing fair use claims.  The 
Court indicated that they would not create any per se rules for 
determining whether use is fair.136  In Acuff-Rose, even a 
commercial use could potentially survive a claim of 
infringement,137 while in Sony, a non-transformative use had 
equivalent success.138  
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
Under the second factor of the fair use test, courts 
examine the nature of the copyrighted work.139  Similar to the 
first factor, courts divide the copyrighted work into two sub-
categories: (1) factual or fictional; and (2) published or 
unpublished.140  Use of factual, published works, such as the 
news, garners the strongest likelihood of success on a fair use 
defense.141  At the opposite end of the spectrum, use of fictional, 
published works typically fails on a fair use defense.142  The 
question of fair use, however, becomes more difficult when the 
Court faces factual, yet unpublished accounts.   
In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 
(“Harper & Row”), authors of the soon-to-be-published memoirs 
of former President Gerald Ford brought a suit against a 
magazine that had published portions of the work after 
receiving an illicit copy from an undisclosed source.143  Although 
the District Court rejected the magazine’s fair use claim, the 
  
 136 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (declaring 
that fair use “is not to be simplified with bright-line rules”); Sony, 464 U.S. at 448 
(referring to copyright fair use as an “equitable rule of reason” (citation omitted)). 
 137 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 589.  
 138 Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. 
 139 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).   
 140 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990) (recognizing the 
distinction between factual and fictional works as highly relevant to a fair use 
analysis); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) 
(noting that whether or not a work is published or unpublished “is a critical element of 
its ‘nature’” (citations omitted)). 
 141 See, e.g., Abend, 495 U.S. at 237 (stating that “fair use is more likely to be 
found in factual works than in fictional works”). 
 142 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 
143-44 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that “the scope of fair use is somewhat narrower with 
respect to fictional works”); see also Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 
996 F.2d 1366, 1376 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the second factor “favor[s] . . . creative 
and fictional work[s]”). 
 143 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542. 
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Second Circuit upheld the use as fair.144  Justice O’Connor, 
writing for the majority, reversed the decision of the Second 
Circuit.145  In analyzing the nature of the copyrighted work, 
Justice O’Connor recognized the additional concerns when 
considering a fair use claim dealing with unpublished works.146  
In doing so, she acknowledged the value in the exclusive rights 
a publisher may have prior to publication.147  Ultimately, the 
Court found that the magazine’s unauthorized and 
“clandestine” use infringed the copyright owner’s interests so 
much that the Court could not characterize the use as fair.148 
Again, the Court in Harper & Row seemed to focus on 
the freedom of expression values inherent in copyright law.149  
While the magazine had the right to publish material, such 
slavish copying was impermissible.150  In addition, since the 
original work had yet to be published, the Court implicitly 
recognized the authors’ freedom of expression rights and the 
infringement that occurs when one “free-rides” on another’s 
original work.151 
  
 144 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d 
Cir. 1983), rev’d by, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 145 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569. 
 146 Id. at 564 (stating that “the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to 
unpublished works”). 
 147 Id. (noting the importance of “[t]he right of first publication” and “the 
choices of when, where, and in what form first to publish a work”). 
 148 Id. (denying the fair use defense since the use “so clearly infringes the 
copyright holder’s interests in confidentiality and creative control”). 
 149 For an example of the freedom of expression values found inherent in the 
fair use defense to copyright infringement, see Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall 
Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that “[c]onflicts between 
interests protected by the first amendment and the copyright laws thus far have been 
resolved by application of the fair use doctrine”).  The Wainwright court went on 
further to state that “[w]hat is protected is the manner of expression, the author’s 
analysis or interpretation of events, the way he structures his material and marshals 
facts, his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular developments.”  Id at 
95-96.  See also Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that “First Amendment considerations are relevant in determining whether 
the purpose of copying a work and the nature of the work copied militate in favor of 
finding a given use of a particular work to be a ‘fair use’”). 
 150 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (stating that “the fact that a substantial 
portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value 
of the copied material”). 
 151 Id. (criticizing “the plagiarist who seeks to profit from marketing someone 
else’s copyrighted expression”). 
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C. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
The third factor of the fair use defense to copyright 
infringement requires the court to analyze the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used.152  While again, there are no 
per se rules as to what constitutes too much copying, the courts 
generally view this factor as heavily related to the purpose and 
character of the use.153  The analysis under the third factor 
differs amongst parodies, books, and other areas in which one 
asserts a fair use defense.154  Even the reproduction of an entire 
work will not preclude a fair use defense in some situations, 
such as the time-shifting in Sony.155  Similarly, courts might 
permit substantial quotations in a book review or a newscast 
recapping a speech, but not in an exclusive, yet-to-be published 
work.156   
In parody, the third factor also implicates the fourth 
factor,157 since the borrowing inherent in parody may affect the 
market or value of the copyrighted work.158  The Court in Acuff-
Rose recognized the difficulty posed by parody, because parody 
must remind the listener or reader of the original in order to 
succeed.159  Therefore, although a successful parody appears to 
patently fail the third factor of the test, if one “depart[s] 
markedly” and adds other “distinctive sounds,” a court may 
characterize a parody as a fair use.160 
  
 152 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).  
 153 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994) 
(stating that in analyzing the third factor, “attention turns to the persuasiveness of a 
parodist’s justification for the particular copying done, and the enquiry will harken 
back to the first of the statutory factors, for . . . the extent of permissible copying varies 
with the purpose and character of the use”). 
 154 See id. (analyzing the third factor in parody by “turn[ing] to the 
persuasiveness of a parodist’s justification for the particular copying done).  But cf. 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565-66 (analyzing the third factor in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms in the publishing context).  
 155 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 
(1984) (noting that the full reproduction of protected works “does not . . . militat[e] 
against a finding of fair use” when involving non-commercial use).   
 156 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (noting that “substantial quotations might 
qualify as fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a speech”). 
 157 For a greater discussion of the fourth factor, see discussion infra Part II.D. 
 158 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587 (stating that the third factor “reveal[s] the 
degree to which the parody may serve as a market substitute for the original or 
potentially licensed derivatives”). 
 159 Id. at 588 (stating that “[p]arody’s humor . . . springs from recognizable 
allusion to its object through distorted imitation”). 
 160 Id. at 589. 
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D. The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market or Value of 
the Copyrighted Work 
The final factor of the fair use test in copyright law 
analyzes the effect of the use on the potential market or value 
of the copyrighted work.161  Traditionally, courts have placed 
the greatest weight on the fourth factor.162  Courts typically 
limit fair use to copying which does not significantly affect the 
market of the copied work.163  According to the Second Circuit, 
this fourth factor should strike a balance between the benefits 
to the public in permitting the use and the personal gains the 
copyright owner may receive in denying the use.164  Generally, 
if an alleged infringing use significantly impacts or “corners” 
the market, the use will fail the fourth factor.165  
The facts of Harper & Row offered the Court an ideal 
opportunity to illustrate a use that fails the fourth factor.166  
Following Nation Enterprise’s unauthorized use of Gerald 
Ford’s soon-to-be published memoirs, Time magazine cancelled 
its exclusive deal with the publishers and refused to pay the 
$12,500 to which the two parties had already agreed upon.167  
Presented with this evidence of the direct effect the infringing 
use had on the market, the Court stated, “[r]arely will a case of 
copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of 
  
 161 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).   
 162 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.05[A][4] (2005) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (stating that the fourth factor 
often “emerges as the most important, and indeed, central” factor in fair use cases 
(citations omitted)). 
 163 1 id. § 1.10[D] (stating that fair use is limited to “copying by others that 
does not materially impair the marketability of the work that is copied” (citations 
omitted)). 
 164 MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981).  The MCA court also 
noted that “[t]he less adverse effect that an alleged infringing use has on the copyright 
owner’s expectation of gain, the less public benefit need be shown to justify the use.”  
Id. 
 165 See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 621 
F.2d 57, 62 (1980) (finding with respect to the fourth factor that “ABC did foreclose a 
significant potential market . . . monopolized that market . . . [and] usurped an 
extremely significant market”). 
 166 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567 
(1985). 
 167 Id. 
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actual damage.”168  In denying Nation Enterprise’s fair use 
defense, the Court relied heavily on this fourth factor.169   
Although the fair use doctrine requires courts to 
examine all four factors of the test, courts often imply the 
potentially dispositive effect of the fourth and final factor, 
irrespective of the results of the other portions of the test.170  
Courts, however, must still rule on a case-by-case basis and 
consider all factors.171  In copyright cases, this test gives courts 
significant guidance to address fair use claims in various 
contexts.  Trademark law would benefit from similar 
articulation by the courts. 
III. WHY TRADEMARK LAW CAN BORROW FROM COPYRIGHT 
LAW  
There are distinct differences between what copyright 
and trademark law actually protect.172  Similar motivations 
behind the desire to protect both, however, justify the idea that 
trademark law can borrow from copyright law.  Not only does 
protection of both of these types of intellectual property seek to 
curb free-riding,173 but it also creates economic incentives.174  In 
addition, protection attempts to balance the competing public 
interests in fostering competition with the private interests in 
  
 168 Id. 
 169 See id. at 569 (stating that “a fair use doctrine that permits extensive 
prepublication quotations from an unreleased manuscript . . . poses substantial 
potential for damage to the marketability of first serialization rights in general”). 
 170 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
451 (1984) (stating that in the non-commercial context, fair use will fail if a copyright 
holder demonstrates that the use “would adversely affect the potential market for the 
copyrighted work”). 
 171 See, e.g., Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1110-11 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (fair use defense failed even though the fourth factor favored the 
defendant); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (while 
suggesting fair use on the first three factors, the Court remanded to allow the hole in 
the evidence with respect to the fourth factor to “be plugged on remand”). 
 172 Copyright protects the more tangible rights in music, books, and works of 
art.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).  Trademark, in contrast, protects the intangible 
right of goodwill associated with a trademark owner’s product or service.  See 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 3:2. 
 173 See Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright: How Intimate Should 
the Close Association Become?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 90 (1989) (stating that 
intellectual property law is “intended to increase the creative and distributional 
efficiency of market participants”). 
 174 See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park And Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) 
(protecting trademarks “encourages producers to cultivate the goodwill associated with 
a particular mark”); Stephen B. Thau, Copyright, Privacy, and Fair Use, 24 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 179, 180 (1995) (protecting copyrights “create[s] economic incentives for 
creativity”). 
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protecting an individual’s property rights.175  For example, if an 
individual is granted no protection for a copyright or a 
trademark, anyone can simply copy an artistic creation or 
source-identifying word or symbol and share in the success of 
its creator or owner.  To avoid this free-riding, copyright and 
trademark law grant certain protections to owners of 
intellectual property.  This, in turn, helps create economic 
incentives to these owners.176  The law, however, moves 
cautiously not to over-protect these property rights, because 
this could inhibit competition or freedom of expression.177  
Therefore, these protections are not limitless.   
By creating the doctrine of fair use, both copyright and 
trademark law limit their protections to help safeguard other 
important societal values.178  Both doctrines of fair use are 
heavily intertwined with the First Amendment’s protection of 
free speech.179  Additionally, just as protecting intellectual 
property creates market incentives,180 limiting protection has a 
similar economic rationale.181  In copyright law, a significant 
part of the fair use defense requires courts to examine the 
effect the alleged infringing use may have on the potential 
  
 175 See ZOE HILDEN & BRIAN T. JAENICKE, FAIR USE OF TRADEMARKS: A LOOK 
AT THE KP PERMANENT MAKE-UP, INC. V. LASTING IMPRESSION I, INC. AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, at 3 (2005) (noting 
that protecting intellectual property often creates “a struggle between competing public 
interests – namely, consumer protection and incentives to social progress versus 
competition and the free flow of information – as well as competing private interests – 
namely, property rights versus individual free expression”). 
 176 See supra note 174. 
 177 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Corp., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that “[o]verprotection stifles the very creative 
forces [intellectual property is] supposed to nurture” (citations omitted)); see also 
HILDEN & JAENICKE, supra note 175, at 1 (recognizing that “intellectual property rights 
[are] an obstacle to free competition [and] a hindrance to the free flow of information 
and ideas in the public domain as well as to the individual right to free expression”). 
 178 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 179 See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications 
of the Emerging Rationale for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 
207 (1982) (noting that “extensions of the trademark monopoly must be tempered by 
the realization that unlimited control over the use of trade symbols will at times 
interfere with the exercise of basic first amendment rights”); L. Ray Patterson, Free 
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 (1987) (arguing that fair use is 
“the most important and far reaching” free speech constraint on copyright protection). 
 180 See supra note 174. 
 181 See Thau, supra note 174, at 186 (arguing that the Supreme Court stresses 
economic incentives when assessing fair use in copyright); see also HILDEN & JAENICKE, 
supra note 175, at 7 (recognizing that Congress codified the concept of ‘classic fair use’ 
“[a]s a means of avoiding the danger that commonplace phrases might be adopted as 
marks and become the exclusive property of private owners”). 
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market or value of the copyrighted work.182  Likewise, in 
trademark law, fair use allows competitors to use trademarks 
in good faith in their true descriptive sense to avoid monopolies 
on descriptive words which inhibit free competition.183   
This section will further explain the rationales behind 
intellectual property protection and fair use in order to justify 
incorporating principles of copyright’s fair use test into the 
realm of trademark fair use.  The last part of this section will 
be devoted to the idea that trademarks, while designed to 
identify source, have begun to do work they were not originally 
meant to do.184  For example, while at one time, a trademark 
was stitched on the inside of a shirt collar, trademarks are now 
often found as a part of the shirt itself, such as the Lacoste 
crocodile,185 and consumers desire a visible trademark as a sign 
of status or style.186  Although trademarks have traditionally 
been considered a quasi-property right, and not a tangible 
property right such as a copyright, these shifts might warrant 
reconsideration of the protections of trademark law.187   
A. Why Does the Law Protect Copyrights and Trademarks? 
 
The protection of copyrights and trademarks serves 
three main purposes: (1) to prohibit free-riding;188 (2) to create 
economic incentives;189 and (3) to balance the competing public 
  
 182 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (stating that effect on the potential market is 
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”). 
 183 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 184 See generally, Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
960 (1993). 
 185 Most people immediately recognize a Lacoste shirt by the crocodile which 
adorns the outside of  the item.  For further illustrations, see the Lacoste website, 
http://www.lacoste.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
 186 See Kozinski, supra note 184, at 961 (recognizing the “growing tendency to 
use trademarks . . . to enhance or adorn [products], even to create new commodities 
altogether”). 
 187 Id. at 966 (arguing that this change should be confronted by amending the 
Lanham Act). 
 188 See Burgunder, supra note 173, at 90 (stating that intellectual property 
law is “intended to increase the creative and distributional efficiency of market 
participants”).  
 189 See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park And Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) 
(protecting trademarks “encourages producers to cultivate the goodwill associated with 
a particular mark”); see also Thau, supra note 174, at 180 (protecting copyrights 
“create[s] economic incentives for creativity”). 
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and private interests inherent in both.190  In 1946, Congress 
enacted the Lanham Act191 “to secure to the owner of [a 
trademark] the goodwill of his business and to protect the 
ability of consumers to distinguish among competing 
producers.”192  Although state protections existed previously,193 
Congress felt that national protection was warranted to foster 
competition and ensure product quality by securing trademark 
holders with the benefits of a good reputation.194  At the most 
basic level, these protections discouraged free-riders.195  
Without these protections, individuals could capitalize on their 
competitors’ previously established goodwill.  For example, if a 
particular brand of shirt became popular, a competitor could 
simply attach that name to his shirts and instantly create a 
market for his goods.  These protections also created an 
economic incentive for a trademark owner to establish a strong 
trade reputation and economic efficiency for consumers who 
can easily identify quality through the use of trademarks.196  
Trademark law, however, must avoid overprotection which 
might limit freedom of speech or hinder competition.197  
Generally speaking, the law disfavors monopolies, and if 
protection is absolute, competition or free speech can suffer.198 
  
 190 See HILDEN & JAENICKE, supra note 175, at 3 (noting that protecting 
intellectual property often creates “a struggle between competing public interests – 
namely, consumer protection and incentives to social progress versus competition and 
the free flow of information – as well as competing private interests – namely, property 
rights versus individual free expression”). 
 191 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2000). 
 192 Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 (citing S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong. 2d Sess., 
at 3, 5 (1946)). 
 193 See Federal Trademark Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 724 (trademark protection 
was a matter of state concern governed by the common law). 
 194 Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 (citing S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong. 2d Sess., 
at 4 (1946)). 
 195 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2:1 (stating that trademark is, in part, 
based on “the plaintiff’s interest in not having the fruit of his labor misappropriated”).  
 196 See Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 (protecting a trademark “encourages 
producers to cultivate the goodwill associated with a particular mark”); see also 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267 (1988) (concluding that “trademark law . . . can best be 
explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency”). 
 197 See supra note 190; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2:1 (noting that 
trademark protection “has traditionally been a battleground for competing policies”). 
 198 See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (stating that “[o]ne who seeks to register (or protect) a product or 
container configuration as a trademark must demonstrate that its design is 
‘nonfunctional’”); see also Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 
886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (construing the Lanham Act narrowly when the First 
Amendment is implicated). 
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Although copyright law protects a different type of 
property, namely creative works such as songs or books,199 the 
principles behind protection are not all that different from 
those of trademark law.  Copyright law also seeks to curb free-
riding “by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”200  In doing so, copyright law creates strong 
economic incentives to create original works by granting 
authors a bundle of rights.201  Again, similar to trademark law, 
copyright law’s protections are not limitless and sometimes 
yield to the protections of the First Amendment.202   
B. Why Does the Law Limit Copyright and Trademark 
Protection by Fair Use? 
 
Both copyright and trademark law limit protections 
through their respective doctrines of fair use.203  In permitting 
some unauthorized, but fair uses, both areas of intellectual 
property law use similar economic efficiency204 and free speech 
rationales205 to justify borrowing.  In trademark law, when a 
court determines that an alleged infringing use is fair, they 
are, in essence, telling the mark owner that this infringement 
will not cause unwarranted confusion and that barring the use 
would foster unfair competition and hinder free speech.206  
Similarly, in copyright law, when a court determines that an 
alleged infringing use is fair, they are telling the copyright 
holder that the use furthers innovation as it does not intrude 
  
 199 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 200 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 201 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (2000) (granting copyright holders the right to 
reproduce their works, to prepare derivative works, and to distribute copies). 
 202 See Patterson, supra note 179, at 4 (arguing that “the copyright clause 
limits the power of Congress to grant copyright because it embodies free speech 
constraints”). 
 203 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 204 See Thau, supra note 174, at 186 (arguing that the Supreme Court stresses 
economic incentives when assessing fair use in copyright); see also HILDEN & JAENICKE, 
supra note 175, at 7 (noting that Congress codified the concept of ‘classic fair use’ “[a]s 
a means of avoiding the danger that commonplace phrases might be adopted as marks 
and become the exclusive property of private owners”). 
 205 See Denicola, supra note 179, at 207 (noting that “extensions of the 
trademark monopoly must be tempered by the realization that unlimited control over 
the use of trade symbols will at times interfere with the exercise of basic first 
amendment rights”); Patterson, supra note 179, at 36 (arguing that fair use is “the 
most important and far reaching” free speech constraint on copyright protection). 
 206 See discussion infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text. 
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too far into the original work and that barring the use would 
again hinder free speech and have adverse economic effects.207  
In permitting fair use of another’s trademark, the 
Lanham Act seeks to prohibit a trademark owner from having 
the exclusive right in a descriptive term which others may use 
to describe their goods.208  The Supreme Court has long since 
acknowledged that an “absolute prohibition” against using 
another’s trademark would result in undesirable 
overprotection.209  The statutory fair use defense recognizes 
that the public should retain rights in the use of language.210  
The law seeks to carefully balance the monopoly created by 
trademark protection with the protections of the First 
Amendment.211   
That is not to say, however, that the protections of the 
First Amendment alone justify a fair use defense.212  While 
trademark fair use certainly intertwines freedom of speech 
concerns, a trademark owner’s rights need not always cease at 
the door of the First Amendment.213  On the other hand, certain 
situations in trademark law directly implicate the First 
Amendment.214  It is behind these driving principles that fair 
use in trademark exists.   
Fair use in copyright was derived upon similar 
principles, although its history runs much deeper.  Upon 
drafting § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress 
  
 207 See discussion infra notes 215-26 and accompanying text. 
 208 Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating 
that fair use “forbids a trademark registrant to appropriate a descriptive term for his 
exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a characteristic of their 
goods”). 
 209 Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall’s Safe Co., 208 U.S. 554, 559 (1908) 
(noting that such a restriction “would carry trademarks too far”).   
 210 Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park And Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 215 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (declaring that “[l]anguage, even in a commercial context, 
properly belongs to the public” (citations omitted)). 
 211 Denicola, supra note 179, at 207 (stating that “extensions of the trademark 
monopoly must be tempered by the realization that unlimited control over the use of 
trade symbols will at times interfere with the exercise of basic first amendment 
rights”). 
 212 See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(stating that “the protection afforded by the First Amendment does not give [an alleged 
infringer] license to infringe [trademark] rights”). 
 213 Id. (explaining that trademark rights need not “yield to the exercise of 
First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of 
communication exist” (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))). 
 214 Denicola, supra note 179, at 207 (stating that “[w]hen the trademark is 
utilized as a vehicle for the communication of ideas . . . constitutional interests can no 
longer be ignored”). 
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recognized the judicial doctrine of fair use as “one of the most 
important and well-established limitations on the exclusive 
right of copyright owners” and “an equitable rule of reason.”215  
Courts have acknowledged this principle since as early as the 
nineteenth century when Justice Story declared that “[e]very 
book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must 
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and 
used before.”216  In codifying these longstanding principles, 
Congress effectively protected an individual’s rights to free 
expression with limitations.   
The Supreme Court, in its application of the fair use 
test, has often evoked principles of free speech.217  Under the 
first factor of the fair use test,218 courts are typically more likely 
to protect transformative uses, which both foster creativity 
while at the same time protect free speech.219  As the Court has 
recently noted, copyright law must balance the different 
interests at stake such as promoting creativity while still 
protecting copyright holders’ rights.220   
Copyright fair use also examines the market effects 
infringement may have,221 as the fourth factor of the test 
requires courts to look at the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.222  The 
first and second factors of the test also implicate these 
concerns.223  The analysis of the purpose and character of the 
use looks at whether a use is commercial or non-commercial,224 
  
 215 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5678-79. 
 216 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436). 
 217 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (declaring 
that “[w]hether . . . parody is in good taste or bad does not and should not matter to fair 
use”). 
 218 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000). 
 219 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 220 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 
2775 (2005) (describing copyright claims as “an exercise in managing the trade-off” 
between “the respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright 
protection and promoting innovation . . . by limiting the incidence of liability for 
copyright infringement”).  
 221 See Thau, supra note 174, at 186 (suggesting that many of the Supreme 
Court’s recent copyright decisions involving fair use “turned on the role that fair use 
would play in copyright’s scheme of economic incentives”). 
 222 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
 223 See id. § 107(1)-(2). 
 224 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 
(1984) (stating that “to make copies for a commercial or profit-making 
purpose . . . would presumptively be unfair”). 
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and the nature of the copyrighted work considers whether the 
work is published or unpublished.225   
Similar to the goals of trademark fair use, copyright fair 
use balances the interests at stake to determine when 
infringement is improper.226  Therefore, it would make sense to 
examine copyright law when considering how to better analyze 
trademark fair use claims. 
C. The Expansion of Trademarks Beyond Source 
Identification 
Traditionally, trademarks serve primarily source-
identifying functions.227  More recently, however, societal trends 
have altered the landscape of trademark usage and provided an 
additional reason for reconsidering the limitations on 
trademark protection.228  In today’s society, trademarks not 
only indicate source, but are also a desirable part of the 
product itself.229  For example, some consumers purchase 
clothing, hats, and bumper stickers to show allegiance to a 
particular sports team, and the team’s trademark is not a 
source-identifier at all.230  Trademarks can also represent 
status or fashion.  Many clothing companies put their 
trademarks in highly visible places as a selling point for their 
merchandise.  For example, Tommy Hilfiger emblazons their 
trademark on the outside of almost every item of clothing they 
sell.  The trademark can even become the product itself, such 
as a rapper wearing a gold Mercedes-Benz hood ornament 
around his neck.  Online retailers sometimes use a competitor’s 
trademark to generate search engine results or even to trigger 
  
 225 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 
(1985) (acknowledging the value in “[t]he right of first publication” and “the choices of 
when, where, and in what form first to publish a work”). 
 226 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 
2775 (2005). 
 227 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 3:2. 
 228 See Kozinski, supra note 184, at 962-63 (arguing that these new trends 
“raise[] questions about whether – and to what extent – the law should protect 
trademarks”). 
 229 See Kozinski, supra note 184, at 961 (recognizing the “growing tendency to 
use trademarks . . . to enhance or adorn [products], even to create new commodities 
altogether”). 
 230 When one buys a New York Yankees t-shirt from a vendor in the parking 
lot at Yankee stadium, it is highly doubtful that he thinks the New York Yankees 
organization endorses this sale. 
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pop-up advertisements.231  As the role of trademarks expands, 
the law should consider what, of these new roles, trademark 
legislation should protect, and how to effectuate any potential 
changes.  In the realm of fair use, trademark will benefit by 
expanding the current test and incorporating analogous 
aspects of copyright fair use and its considerably more 
comprehensive test.  
IV. INCORPORATING COPYRIGHT FAIR USE INTO TRADEMARK 
FAIR USE  
Given the changing landscape of trademarks232 as well 
as the confusion following the Supreme Court’s take on fair use 
in KP Permanent,233 courts must facilitate a better approach to 
assessing trademark fair use.  Due to the similarities to 
copyright law, trademark law would benefit from looking to 
copyright’s fair use test, which courts have applied more 
consistently.  Copyright fair use applies a significantly more 
comprehensive test to ascertain whether or not a use is fair.234  
If the factors of that test are analogized to the areas of 
trademark law which they most resemble, trademark law, too, 
will have similar consistency in the courts.  While a copyright 
fair use claim involves a careful analysis of the original work, 
the alleged infringing use, and the market effects,235 the 
Lanham Act only requires an analysis of the alleged infringing 
use to determine if the use is fair.236  In KP Permanent, the 
Court suggested that if the alleged infringing use met the 
elements of the fair use defense, the defense could succeed even 
when there is consumer confusion.237  Although the Court 
indicated that some level of confusion might defeat the fair use 
  
 231 See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Whenu.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 403 (2d Cir. 
2005) (holding that a search engine’s use of a trademark to trigger advertising does not 
qualify as “use” of the mark under Lanham Act); but cf. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. 
Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) (reaching the opposite 
conclusion). 
 232 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 233 See discussion supra Part I.E. 
 234 In addition to the four factor test, the Court has also noted that additional 
factors can be considered.  See Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the four statutory factors “are not 
necessarily the exclusive determinants of the fair use inquiry and do not 
mechanistically resolve fair use issues”).  
 235 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 236 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).   
 237 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
121 (2004). 
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defense, they gave no suggestion as to how lower courts can 
come to this conclusion.238  By failing to give any guidance, the 
Court ignored one of the pinnacle justifications behind 
trademark protection: avoiding marketplace confusion.239   
In “classic” fair use claims, courts should consider more 
than just the nature of the alleged infringing use to better 
determine how much confusion would bar the defense.  As it 
currently stands, the Lanham Act only requires that courts 
determine if the trademark is used descriptively, not as a 
trademark, fairly, and in good faith.240  In reviewing these 
considerations, courts, in actuality, only assess the alleged 
infringer’s conduct and use.241  This is similar to the first factor 
of copyright fair use, which looks at the purpose and character 
of the use.242  One can only imagine what would become of 
copyright fair use if it only considered the first factor of the 
four factor test required by statute.243   
Trademark law also touches on the third factor of the 
copyright test which assesses the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used.244  What the trademark test fails to consider, 
however, is a trademark owner’s rights, his use of the 
trademark, and how the alleged infringing use may affect the 
market.  One of the most important considerations in copyright 
fair use is the fourth factor of the test which assesses the 
potential economic effects of the alleged infringing use.245  In 
fact, both copyright and trademark fair use were constructed 
around goals of economic efficiency.246  Without reviewing the 
trademark itself, its owner’s rights, and the economic effects in 
permitting or denying a defendant’s alleged infringing use, 
courts will ignore the primary concerns in creating the fair use 
defense in the first place. 
Courts hearing trademark cases should consider both 
parties’ use of the trademark as well as the respective markets 
  
 238 Id.  
 239 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). 
 240 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 241 See id.  The considerations of the Lanham Act address only how the alleged 
infringer uses the trademark. 
 242 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000). 
 243 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 244 See id. § 107(3). 
 245 See id. § 107(4); see also 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 162, 
§ 13.05[A][4] (stating that the fourth factor often “emerges as the most important, and 
indeed, central” factor in fair use cases (citations omitted)). 
 246 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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in which they sell their products, just as courts hearing 
copyright cases consider the nature of the copyrighted work as 
well as economic effects in permitting or denying fair use.  In 
looking at the plaintiff’s use of the trademark, the analysis 
should not be all that different from a typical likelihood of 
confusion analysis.247  Courts, however, should reexamine the 
likelihood of confusion in light of the fair use claim which may 
alter their conclusions.  Courts can look at the strength of the 
plaintiff’s trademark as well as when it was registered 
juxtaposed to the defendant’s use of the trademark.  A plaintiff 
who has had its trademark federally registered and in use for 
over ten years before a defendant incorporated the words into 
its advertisement should find itself in a much better position 
than a plaintiff who has just recently registered a trademark 
years after a defendant began using the words to market its 
product.248  These two different scenarios would create entirely 
different economic effects, and if trademark fair use is based, in 
part, around such concerns, these types of facts must be 
considered.  Economic effects cannot be properly addressed by 
simply analyzing a defendant’s use and bad faith.  Copyright 
law reviews the plaintiff’s work, and in doing so, properly 
addresses economic issues.  There is no reason trademark law 
should not follow that model for success. 
Trademark law could also subdivide the factors of its 
test to achieve more equitable results.  In copyright law, 
certain uses will garner a stronger likelihood of success, such 
as transformative, non-commercial uses.249  In trademark law, 
the Lanham Act does consider the transformative nature of the 
use by considering whether the alleged infringer uses the 
trademark descriptively and not as a trademark.250  The 
statute, however, does not require that courts assess whether 
the use is commercial or non-commercial.251  Trademark law 
can incorporate this inquiry by examining the relatedness of 
the goods or services between plaintiffs and defendants.  
Although courts hearing trademark cases already consider this 
factor when evaluating the likelihood of confusion, they should 
  
 247 See supra note 32. 
 248 The latter situation is not all that different from the facts of KP 
Permanent, in which KP had used the words prior to Lasting Impression’s registration.  
See KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114 
(2004). 
 249 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 250 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 251 See id. 
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revisit the issue when assessing fair use.  For example, a 
defendant may use another’s trademark in the sale of goods, 
which is unquestionably a commercial use.  If the defendant 
sells breakfast cereal, however, and the plaintiff manufactures 
automobiles, the use might not be considered commercial as it 
relates to the plaintiff’s business.  This additional consideration 
will speak to economic repercussions as well, since an 
automobile manufacturer can hardly claim that a cereal maker 
has adversely affected his business.  Similar to copyright law, 
this additional consideration is not dispositive but simply 
assists courts in evaluating fair use claims. 
The dilution of trademarks should also be considered in 
the post-KP Permanent world as it applies to fair use.252  
Dilution occurs when a famous mark is misappropriated in a 
way that causes it to lose its distinctive value in the 
marketplace.253  Since the Lanham Act requires a distinctive 
trademark as opposed to a descriptive one to generate a claim 
of dilution,254 dilution is not applicable to statutory fair use, but 
often appears in nominative fair use claims.  Some judges have 
already begun to blend copyright law with trademark law in 
dilution claims to achieve more equitable results.255  When 
Mattel, makers of Barbie, brought a suit against the record 
companies who produced, marketed, and sold Barbie Girl, a 
song which poked fun at Barbie, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s use under the 
nominative fair use doctrine, but in doing so, cited to a 
copyright case.256  Perhaps Judge Kozinski’s opinion 
foreshadows the future of fair use in trademark law.  In the 
area of nominative fair use, particularly parody, courts must 
look outside trademark law to find answers.  A trademark in 
parody does not identify source at all, but rather calls the 
consumer’s attention to the parody through the use of a 
trademark.257  Since copyright fair use has successfully and 
  
 252 See HILDEN & JAENICKE, supra note 175, at 22 (recognizing that “[i]t 
remains to be seen what diluting uses will nonetheless be deemed to be fair in the 
name of fostering free expression”). 
 253 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). 
 254 Id. 
 255 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 256 See id. at 901 (stating that “[t]he song does not rely on the Barbie mark to 
poke fun at another subject but targets Barbie herself”) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) and Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books 
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 257 Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 
490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that “the keystone of parody is imitation”). 
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consistently addressed parody,258 those cases can provide courts 
hearing trademark cases with guidance when handling 
nominative fair use claims.259 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although some readers might criticize this 
“incorporation,” this Note does not purport to suggest a 
merging of copyright and trademark law but rather a 
consideration of copyright fair use to better facilitate consistent 
applications of fair use in trademark.  The Supreme Court has 
already rejected a merging of the two areas of intellectual 
property,260 but the type of incorporation proposed in this Note 
is of an entirely different nature.  The suggestions of this Note 
are highly significant in assessing fair use in trademark and 
upholding the general policies behind intellectual property 
protection.  Although some of this Note’s proposed fair use 
factors must be proven by the plaintiff, that does not mean that 
they are not relevant to a court’s inquiry into a fair use claim.  
Trademark law is based upon multiple policy concerns, and in 
order to properly address both traditional and new issues that 
arise with respect to trademark infringement, courts must 
balance all the interests at stake.261  As copyright law has 
similar interests at stake,262 the adoption of the analogous 
factors from copyright fair use into trademark law is a natural 
progression which will benefit the courts as well as both 
present and future litigants.   
Both copyright and trademark law have recognized 
infringing yet fair uses for years, but there are distinct 
differences in how the courts have interpreted these two 
doctrines of fair use.  Copyright fair use requires a thorough 
analysis and considers both the original and infringing work as 
well as the economic repercussions.  The trademark test for fair 
  
 258 See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 569. 
 259 See generally Gary Myers, Trademark Parody: Lessons from the Copyright 
Decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 210-11 
(1996). 
 260 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).  
In Dastar, the plaintiff tried to use the Lanham Act to grant relief in what was 
essentially a copyright claim, but the work was in the public domain, and no longer 
protected by a copyright.  Id. at 31.  The Court denied the plaintiff’s attempt at relief.  
Id. at 38.  
 261 See Kozinski, supra note 184, at 977 (properly analyzing trademark rights 
“requir[es] one to balance interests that point in different directions”). 
 262 See discussion supra Part III. 
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use involves a much simpler inquiry focusing only on the 
infringing use.  Copyright protection, however, has deeper 
historical roots than trademark, and courts have had more 
experience in handling copyright fair use claims.  As technology 
blossoms and trademarks flourish, predictability in litigation 
becomes a necessity to business owners.  The state of the law 
will affect business owners not just in litigation but also in 
their selection and use of trademarks.  Trademark law as it 
currently stands does not delineate the factors of a fair use 
claim clearly enough to aid potential litigants.  Since both 
copyright and trademark law share similar goals, it would 
follow naturally to allow trademark fair use claims to borrow 
from the principles of copyright fair use and create a clearer, 
more efficient test.  Without better guidelines, both the courts 
and potential litigants will be wary of how to proceed.  By 
incorporating principles of fair use in copyright, trademark can 
achieve its ultimate goal of avoiding confusion both in the 
marketplace as well as within the judicial system. 
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